The NESSIE project: towards new cryptographic algorithms by Preneel, Bart
1The NESSIE Project: Towards New
Cryptographic Algorithms
Bart Preneel
Katholieke Univ. Leuven, Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESAT,
Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
bart.preneel@esat.kuleuven.ac.be
Abstract. In spite of more than 25 years of open research on crypto-
graphic algorithms, many applications still use insecure cryptography.
This paper attempts to explain this problem and tries to motivate why
continuous research in this area is required. It also discusses the status
of the NESSIE project. NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signature,
Integrity and Encryption) is a 40-month research project (2000-2003)
which intends to put forward a new generation of strong cryptographic
algorithms, which have been obtained after an open call and an open
evaluation process.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic algorithms play a crucial role in the information society. When we
use our ATM or credit card, call someone on a mobile phone, get access to health
care services, or buy something on the web, cryptographic algorithms are used
to offer protection. These algorithms guarantee that nobody can steal money
from our account, place a call at our expense, eavesdrop on our phone calls,
or get unauthorized access to sensitive health data. It is clear that information
technology will become increasingly pervasive: in the short term we expect to see
more of e-government, e-voting, m-commerce, . . . ; beyond that we can expect
the emergence of ubiquitous (or pervasive) computing, ambient intelligence,. . .
These new environments and applications will present new security challenges,
and there is no doubt that cryptographic algorithms and protocols will form part
of the solution.
While cryptography is an essential component, the importance of cryptog-
raphy should be put in the correct perspective. Indeed, failure of security sys-
tems can often be blamed on other reasons than failure of cryptography (see
for example Anderson [1]). Nevertheless, cryptographic algorithms are part of
the foundations of the security house, and any house with weak foundations will
collapse. There is thus no excuse whatsoever to employ weak cryptography; nev-
ertheless, we encounter weak cryptography more frequently than necessary and
this for several reasons:
– Cryptography is a fascinating discipline, which tends to attract ‘do-it-yourself’
people, who are not aware of the scientific developments of the last 25 years;
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2their home-made algorithms can typically be broken in a few minutes by an
expert;
– Use of short key lengths, in part due to export controls (mainly in the US,
who dominates the software market) which limited key sizes to 40 bits (or 56
bits) for symmetric ciphers, 512 bits for factoring based systems (RSA) and
discrete logarithm modulo a large prime (Diffie-Hellman). The US export re-
strictions have been lifted to a large extent in January and October 2000 (see
Koops [15] for details). In several countries, domestic controls were imposed;
the best known example is France, where the domestic controls were lifted
in January 1999. Nevertheless, it can take a long time before all applications
are upgraded.
– Progress in cryptanalysis: open academic research has started in the mid
1970ies; cryptology is now an established academic research discipline, and
the IACR (International Association for Cryptologic Research) has more
than 1000 members. As a consequence of this, increasingly sophisticated
techniques are developed to break cryptosystems, but fortunately also to
improve their security.
– Progress in computational power: Moore’s law, which was formulated in
1965, predicts that every 18 months transistor density will double. Empiri-
cal observations have proved him right (at least for data density) and experts
believe that this law will be holding for at least another 15 years. The vari-
ation of Moore’s law for computational power states that the amount of
computation that can be done for the same cost doubles every 18 month.
This implies that a key for a symmetric algorithm will become thousand
times cheaper to find after 15 years (or needs to increase in length by 10
bits to offer the same security). An even larger threat may be the emergence
of new computer models: if quantum computers can be built, factoring may
be very easy (a result by Shor of 1994 [27]). While early experiments are
promising [30], experts are divided on the question whether sufficiently pow-
erful quantum computers can be built in the next 15 years. For symmetric
cryptography, quantum computers are less of a threat: they can reduce the
time to search a 2n-bit key to the time to search an n-bit key (using Grover’s
algorithm [11]). Hence doubling the key length offers an adequate protection.
As a consequence of all these observations, insecure cryptographic algorithms
are much more common than they should be. In order to avoid these problems,
adequate control mechanisms should be established at several levels:
– Substantial evaluation is necessary before an algorithm can be used; experts
seem to agree that a period of 3 to 5 years is required between first publica-
tion and use of an algorithm.
– Continuous monitoring is required during the use of a primitive, to verify
whether they are still adequate. Especially for public key primitives, which
are parameterizable, a rigorous monitoring procedure is required to establish
minimal key lengths.
– Adequate procedures should be foreseen to take an algorithm out of service
or to upgrade an algorithm. Single DES is a typical example of an algorithm
Appeared in Information Security Applications, 3rd International Workshop,
WISA 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 33–16, 2002.
c©2002 Springer-Verlag
3which has been used beyond its lifetime (for most applications, 56 bits was
no longer an adequate key length in the 1990ies); another example is the
GSM encryption algorithm A5/1: experts agree that it is not as secure as
believed (see e.g. Biryukov et al. [4]), but it is very difficult to upgrade it.
Especially the last problem should not be underestimated: for data authenti-
cation purposes, a new security weaknesses that is discovered will typically not
influence older events, and long-term security can be achieved by techniques such
as re-signing. However, for confidentiality the problem is much more dramatic:
one cannot prevent that an opponent has access to ciphertext, and in certain
cases (e.g., medical applications) secrecy for 50–100 years is required. This means
that an encryption algorithm used now will need to withstand attacks employed
in 2075. It is probably easier to imagine how hard it must have been to design
in 1925 an encryption system that needed to be secure for 75 years. There is no
reason to believe that this problem is easier at the beginning of the 21st century.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how the
cryptographic challenge can be addressed, and what the role can be of integrated
research projects. Section 3 introduces the NESSIE project and it approach.
Section 4 discusses the status of the algorithms evaluated by NESSIE 6 months
before the end of the project, and Sect. 5 presents some conclusions.
2 Addressing the Cryptography Challenge
Several elements are essential to tackle the cryptographic problem: standardiza-
tion, research, and an open evaluation process.
A first element is the use of open standardization mechanisms, which are
based on scientific evaluation rather than on commercial pressure. It is clear
that algorithms should only be included in standards if they have received suf-
ficient scrutiny. Moreover, the standardization body should establish adequate
maintenance mechanisms in order to allow for timely revocation of algorithms
or upgrade of parameters. One problem is that there are many standardization
bodies, each with their own approach (EESSI, ETSI, IEEE, IETF, ISO, NIST,
ANSI, . . . ). Algorithm revocation mechanisms are often too slow as standard
maintenance procedures typically have large time constants. An example of a
successful standardization effort is the NIST selection process for the Advanced
Encryption Standard; this has been a 4-year effort resulting in the publication
of FIPS 197 in November 2001 [9].
During the last 25 years, cryptographic research has been making substantial
progress, and it is fair to say that cryptography has been evolving from an ‘art’ to
a scientific discipline. Some of the most important developments have been made
under influence of theoretical computer science: rigorous security definitions have
been developed (which can takes sometimes many years to crystallize), and the
reductionist approach has been introduced, also known as ‘provable security.’
This implies that formal proofs are provided that a weakness in a cryptographic
primitive will imply that a hard problem can be solved. It should be noted
however that this improves the state of the art significantly, but it does not solve
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is notoriously hard, or to quote James L. Massey “A hard problem is a problem
that nobody works on.” As a consequence, modern public-key cryptology depends
on a limited set of problems believed to be hard. Most of these originate from
algebraic number theory, the most popular ones are factoring the product of large
primes and computing the discrete logarithm modulo a large prime. The discrete
logarithm in other algebraic structures (defined by elliptic and hyper-elliptic
curves) is also receiving attention. However, there is a clear need to perform
more research on hard problems and to construct new schemes on other classes
of hard problems. In the area of symmetric cryptology, a similar reductionist
approach is being used. In this case however, the hard problems are typically
not generic mathematical problems. The security is based on ‘ad hoc’ designs,
which have been developed based on years of experience and based on evaluation
against existing and newly developed generic and specific attacks. In this area,
performance is often very important. There is a need for new algorithms (stream
ciphers, one-way functions, block ciphers) that have undergone a substantial
security evaluation and that offer a better security performance trade-off for new
environments (64-bit processors, smart cards, ultra-low power applications).
In order to guarantee the success of the standardization mechanisms, an
independent and open evaluation effort is required to bridge the gap between the
academic research community and the requirements of the applications. There
are several reasons why such an effort is required:
– Academic research is more focused on providing a wide range of solutions
with various properties rather than on providing a single solution.
– Academic research may not always fully specify all details of the algorithm,
but rather focus on generic design approaches.
– Academic research often ignores certain ‘small’ problems that need to be
addressed in applications and standards but that seem ‘trivial.’ However,
such small details may have important security implications. A good example
is the mechanism to indicate which hash function has been used together with
the signature scheme, see Kaliski [12].
– Standardization bodies are not always in sink with the most recent academic
developments.
Successful standards require a limited number of algorithms that are fully spec-
ified; this is required for interoperability. However, an algorithm is only useful if
sufficient confidence has been built up, which illustrates the need for a thorough
security evaluation. This may involve checking for statistical vulnerabilities and
obvious weaknesses, applying known attacks, evaluation of the security against
new attacks and a careful verification of all security proofs (the need for this can
be illustrated by the error found by Shoup in the 7-year old OAEP security proof
[28]; the error has been corrected for RSA-OAEP by Fujisaki et al. in [10]). The
selection procedure for the algorithms requires careful benchmarking of secu-
rity (on which problem is the primitive based, which model is required to prove
security, how tight is the reduction,. . . ), performance in various environments
and other issues such as intellectual property. Typically standardization bodies
Appeared in Information Security Applications, 3rd International Workshop,
WISA 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pp. 33–16, 2002.
c©2002 Springer-Verlag
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need for an interface between the research community and the standardization
bodies.
3 The NESSIE Project
NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signature, Integrity, and Encryption) is a
research project within the Information Societies Technology (IST) Programme
of the European Commission. The participants of the project are: Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven (Belgium), coordinator, Ecole Normale Supe´rieure (France),
Royal Holloway, University of London (U.K.), Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Ger-
many), Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (Israel), Universite´ Catholique
de Louvain (Belgium), and Universitetet i Bergen (Norway). NESSIE is a 40-
month project, which started on January 1, 2000. Detailed and up to date in-
formation on the NESSIE project is available at http://cryptonessie.org/.
Next we discuss the NESSIE call and the NESSIE evaluation procedure which
includes both a security and a performance evaluation; we also briefly discuss
the software tools used during the evaluation.
3.1 The NESSIE Call
In the first year of the project, an open call for the submission of cryptographic
algorithms, as well as for evaluation methodologies for these algorithms has
been launched. The scope of this call has been defined together with the project
industry board (PIB); the call was published in February 2000. The deadline for
submissions was September 29, 2000. In response to this call NESSIE received
40 submissions, all of which met the submission requirements.
The NESSIE call includes a request for a broad set of algorithms providing
date confidentiality, data authentication, and entity authentication. These algo-
rithms include block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions, MAC algorithms,
digital signature schemes, and public-key encryption and identification schemes
(for definitions of these algorithms, see [18]). In addition, the NESSIE call asks
for evaluation methodologies for these algorithms. While key establishment pro-
tocols are also very important, it was felt that they should be excluded from the
call, as the scope of the call is already rather broad.
The scope of the NESSIE call is much wider than that of the AES call
launched by NIST [20], which was restricted to 128-bit block ciphers. It is com-
parable to that of the RACE Project RIPE (Race Integrity Primitives Evalu-
ation, 1988-1992) [26] (confidentiality algorithms were excluded from RIPE for
political reasons) and that of the Japanese CRYPTREC project [6] (which also
includes key establishment protocols and pseudo-random number generation).
Another difference is that both AES and CRYPTREC intend to produce algo-
rithms for government standards. The results of NESSIE will not be adopted by
any government or by the European commission. However, the intention is that
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rithms for digital signature and hash functions may be included in the EESSI
standardization documents which specify algorithms recommended for the Eu-
ropean Electronic Signature Directive.
The call also specifies the main selection criteria which will be used to eval-
uate the proposals. These criteria are long-term security, market requirements,
efficiency, and flexibility. Primitives can be targeted towards a specific environ-
ment (such as 8-bit smart cards or high-end 64-bit processors), but it is clearly
an advantage to offer a wide flexibility of use. Security is put forward as the
most important criterion, as security of a cryptographic algorithm is essential to
achieve confidence and to build consensus.
For the security requirements of symmetric algorithms, two main security
levels are specified, named normal and high. The minimal requirements for a
symmetric algorithm to attain either the normal or high security level depend
on the key length, internal memory, or output length of the algorithm. For block
ciphers a third security level, normal-legacy , is specified, with a block size of 64
bits compared to 128 bits for the normal and high security level. The motivation
for this request are applications such as UMTS/3GPP, which intend to use 64-bit
block ciphers for the next 10-15 years. For the asymmetric algorithms, a varying
security level is accepted, with as minimum about 280 3-DES encryptions.
If selected by NESSIE, the algorithm should preferably be available royalty-
free. If this is not possible, then access should be non-discriminatory. The submit-
ter should state the position concerning intellectual property and should update
it when necessary.
The submission requirements are much less stringent than for AES, partic-
ularly in terms of the requirement for software implementations (only ‘portable
C’ is mandatory).
3.2 The NESSIE Evaluation Procedure
As explained above, the NESSIE evaluation process takes into account the fol-
lowing elements: security, performance, and intellectual property status. About
halfway into the project, a decision point has been inserted; at this stage, a sub-
set of the submissions has been selected for a more detailed evaluation in the
2nd phase. Below we discuss the security and performance evaluation and the
tools to support this evaluation.
Security Evaluation. A first step of the evaluation consists of basic checks
on the submission, such as compliance with the call, working software, obvious
weaknesses etc. The aim of this initial check was mainly to ensure that submis-
sions were specified in a consistent and cogent form in time for the November
2000 workshop. It is vital for proper security assessments that the algorithms
are fully and unambiguously described. This process required interaction with
some submitters to ensure that the submissions were in the required form.
The next internal stage (November 2000) was to evaluate every submission
in detail. An important principle adhered to during the evaluation is that if a
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the evaluation, and that all assessments are double-checked by a second project
partner. If substantial flaws were discovered and confirmed, the evaluation of
that primitive was stopped in order to optimize the project resources.
Next, an open workshop was organized in Egham (UK) on September 12-
13, 2001 to discuss the security and performance analysis of the submissions.
The presenters include both researchers from the NESSIE project, but also sub-
mitters, members from the NESSIE PIB, and members from the cryptographic
community at large.
Following this workshop, a comprehensive security evaluation report has been
published (D13 [19]). The document gives an overview of generic attacks on the
different type of algorithms. Moreover, for each symmetric algorithm it presents
a short description, the security claims by the designers, and the reported weak-
nesses and attacks. The part on asymmetric algorithms contains a discussion
of security assumptions, security models, and of the methodology to evaluate
the security. For each algorithm, a short description is followed by a discus-
sion of the provable security (which security properties are proved under which
assumptions) and of the concrete security reduction.
After the workshop, a subset of the algorithm has been selected (cf. Sect. 4.2
for more details). During the second half of the project, the remaining algorithms
are being evaluated in more detail (see e.g., [23, 24]). The results of the 2nd phase
have been presented at an open workshop on November 6-7, 2002 in Munich
(Germany).
Performance Evaluation. Performance evaluation is an essential part in the
assessment of a cryptographic algorithm. The candidates will be used on several
platforms (PCs, smart cards, dedicated hardware) and for various applications.
Some applications have tight timing constraints (e.g., payment applications, cel-
lular phones); for other applications a high throughput is essential (e.g., high
speed networking, hard disk encryption).
First a framework has been defined to compare the performance of algorithms
on a fair and equal basis. It has been used for all evaluations of submitted candi-
dates. First of all a theoretical approach has been established. Each algorithm is
dissected into three parts: setup (independent of key and data), precomputations
(independent of data, e.g., key schedule) and the algorithm itself (that must be
repeated for every use). Next a set of four test platforms has been defined on
which each candidate may be tested. These platforms are smart cards, 32-bit
PCs, 64-bit machines, and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).
Then rules have been defined which specify how performance should be mea-
sured on these platforms. The implementation parameters depend on the plat-
form, but may include RAM, speed, code size, chip area, and power consumption.
On smart cards, only the following parameters will be taken into account, in de-
creasing order of importance: RAM usage, speed, code size. On PCs, RAM has
very little impact, and speed is the main concern. On FPGAs, throughput, la-
tency, chip area and power consumption will be considered. Unfortunately, the
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hardware implementations (ASICs), but it may well be that teams outside the
project can offer assistance for certain algorithms.
The project will consider the resistance of implementations to physical at-
tacks such as timing attacks [13], fault analysis [3, 5], and power analysis [14].
For non constant-time algorithms (data or key dependence, asymmetry between
encryption and decryption) the data or key dependence will be analyzed; other el-
ements that will be taken into account include the difference between encryption
and decryption, and between signature and verification operation. For symmetric
algorithms, the key agility will also be considered.
This approach has resulted in the definition of a platform dependent test and
in several platform dependent rekeying scenarios. Low-cost smart cards will only
be used for block ciphers, MACs, hash functions, stream ciphers, pseudo-random
number generation, and identification schemes.
In order to present performance information in a consistent way within the
NESSIE project, a performance ‘template’ has been developed. The goal of this
template is to collect intrinsic information related to the performance of the
submitted candidates. A first part describes parameters such as word size, mem-
ory requirement, key size and code size. Next the basic operations are analyzed,
such as shift/rotations, table look-ups, permutations, multiplications, additions,
modular reduction, exponentiation, inversion,. . . . Then the nature and speed
of precomputations (setup, key schedule, etc.) are described. Elements such as
the dependence on the keys and on the inputs determine whether the code is
constant-time or not. Alternative representations of the algorithms are explored
when feasible.
Special software has been developed for automated performance testing on
PCs and workstations. The status of the performance evaluation is presented
in [25].
Tools. It is clear that modern computers and sophisticated software tools can-
not replace human cryptanalysis. Nevertheless, software tools can play an im-
portant role in modern cryptanalysis. In most cases, the attacks found by the
cryptanalyst require a large number of computational steps, hence the actual
computation of the attack is performed on a computer. However, software and
software tools can also be essential to find a successful way to attack a symmetric
cryptographic algorithm; examples include differential and linear cryptanalysis,
dependence tests, and statistical tests.
Within NESSIE, we distinguish two classes of tools. The general tools are
not specific for the algorithms to be analyzed. Special tools, which are specific
for the analysis of one algorithm, are implemented when, in the course of the
cryptanalysis of an algorithm, the need for such a tool turns up.
For the evaluation of the symmetric submissions, a comprehensive set of
general tools is available within the project. These tools are in part based on an
improved version of the tools developed by the RIPE (RACE Integrity Primitives
Evaluation) project [26]. These test include more than 20 statistical tests.
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ciphers with differential [2] and linear cryptanalysis [17]. This tool is based on a
general description language for block ciphers.
The software for these tools will not be made available outside the project,
but all the results obtained using these tools will be made public in full detail.
4 The Algorithms Evaluated by NESSIE
4.1 The NESSIE Submissions
The cryptographic community has responded very enthusiastically to the call.
Thirty nine algorithms have been received, as well as one proposal for a test-
ing methodology. After an interaction process, which took about one month, all
submissions comply with the requirements of the call. There are 26 symmetric
algorithms:
– seventeen block ciphers, which is probably not a surprise given the increased
attention to block cipher design and evaluation as a consequence of the AES
competition organized by NIST. They are divided as follows:
• six 64-bit block ciphers: CS-Cipher, Hierocrypt-L1, IDEA, Khazad,
MISTY1, and Nimbus;
• seven 128-bit block ciphers: Anubis, Camellia, Grand Cru, Hierocrypt-
3, Noekeon, Q, and SC2000 (none of these seven come from the AES
process);
• one 160-bit block cipher: Shacal; and
• three block ciphers with a variable block length: NUSH (64, 128, and
256 bits), RC6 (at least 128 bits), and SAFER++ (64 and 128 bits).
– six synchronous stream ciphers: BMGL, Leviathan, LILI-128, SNOW,
SOBER-t16, and SOBER-t32.
– two MAC algorithms: Two-Track-MAC and UMAC; and
– one collision-resistant hash function: Whirlpool.
Thirteen asymmetric algorithms have been submitted:
– five asymmetric encryption schemes: ACE Encrypt, ECIES, EPOC, PSEC,
and RSA-OAEP (both EPOC and PSEC have three variants);
– seven digital signature algorithms: ACE Sign, ECDSA, ESIGN, FLASH,
QUARTZ, RSA-PSS, and SFLASH; and
– one identification scheme: GPS.
Approximately1 seventeen submissions originated within Europe (6 from
France, 4 from Belgium, 3 from Switzerland, 2 from Sweden), nine in North
America (7 USA, 2 from Canada), nine in Asia (8 from Japan), three in Aus-
tralia and three in South America (Brazil). The majority of submissions origi-
nated within industry (27); seven came from academia, and six are the result of
1 Fractional numbers have been used to take into account algorithms with submitters
over several continents/countries – the totals here are approximations by integers,
hence they do not add up to 40.
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a joint effort between industry and academia. Note however that the submitter
of the algorithm may not be the inventor, hence the share of academic research
is probably underestimated by these numbers.
All submissions are available on the NESSIE web site [19].
4.2 Selection for the 2nd Phase
On September 24, 2001, the NESSIE project has announced the selection of
candidates for the 2nd phase of the project. Central to the decision process has
been the project goal, that is, to come up with a portfolio of strong cryptographic
algorithms. Moreover, there was also a consensus that every algorithm in this
portfolio should have a unique competitive advantage that is relevant to an
application.
It is thus clear that an algorithm could not be selected if it failed to meet the
security level required in the call. A second element could be that the algorithm
failed to meet a security claim made by the designer. A third reason to eliminate
an algorithm could be that a similar algorithm exists with better security (for
comparable performance) or with significantly better performance (for compa-
rable security). In retrospect, very few algorithms were eliminated because of
performance reasons; this can be motivated in part because the large number of
submissions did not allow for an in-depth performance evaluation during the 1st
phase. It should also be noted that the selection was more competitive in the
area of block ciphers, where many strong contenders were considered. The mo-
tivation for the decisions is given in [22]. Note that the submissions originating
from industry performed best, while only one submission from academia only
made it the 2nd phase.
Designers of submitted algorithms were allowed to make small alterations
to their algorithms; the main criterion to accept these alterations is that they
should improve the algorithm and not substantially invalidate the existing secu-
rity analysis. More information on the alterations can be found on the NESSIE
webpages [19].
The selected algorithms are listed below; altered algorithms are indicated
with a ∗. Block ciphers:
– IDEA: MediaCrypt AG, Switzerland;
– Khazad∗: Scopus Tecnologia S.A., Brazil and K.U.Leuven, Belgium;
– MISTY1: Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Japan;
– SAFER++64, SAFE++128: Cylink Corp., USA, ETH Zurich, Switzerland,
National Academy of Sciences, Armenia;
– Camellia: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp., Japan and Mitsubishi
Electric, Japan;
– RC6: RSA Laboratories Europe, Sweden and RSA Laboratories, USA;
– Shacal: Gemplus, France.
Here IDEA, Khazad, MISTY1 and SAFER++64 are 64-bit block ciphers. Camel-
lia, SAFER++128 and RC6 are 128-bit block ciphers, which will be compared
to AES/Rijndael [7, 9]. Shacal is a 160-bit block cipher based on SHA-1 [8]. A
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256-bit version of Shacal based on SHA-256 [21] has also been introduced in the
second phase; this algorithm will be compared to an RC-6 and a Rijndael [7]
variant with a block length of 256 bits (note that this variant is not included in
the AES standard). The motivation for this choice is that certain applications
(such as the stream cipher BMGL and certain hash functions) can benefit from
a secure 256-bit block cipher.
Synchronous stream ciphers:
– SOBER-t16, SOBER-t32: Qualcomm International, Australia;
– SNOW∗: Lund Univ., Sweden;
– BMGL∗: Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm and Ericsson Research,
Sweden.
It has become clear in the Spring of 2002 that SOBER-t16, SOBER-t32, and
SNOW have security flaws which imply that they do not meet the stringent se-
curity requirements imposed by NESSIE. Moreover, BMGL submission is rather
slow (more than 10 times slower than AES), hence while is useful as a pseudo-
random bit generator, it is not suitable as a high speed stream cipher for bulk
data.
MAC algorithms and hash functions:
– Two-Track-MAC: K.U.Leuven, Belgium and debis AG, Germany;
– UMAC: Intel Corp., USA, Univ. of Nevada at Reno, USA, IBM Research
Laboratory, USA, Technion, Israel, and Univ. of California at Davis, USA;
– Whirlpool∗: Scopus Tecnologia S.A., Brazil and K.U.Leuven, Belgium.
The hash function Whirlpool will be compared to the new FIPS proposals SHA-
256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 [21].
Public-key encryption algorithms:
– ACE-KEM∗: IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland (derived from
ACE Encrypt);
– EPOC-2∗: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp., Japan;
– PSEC-KEM∗: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp., Japan (derived from
PSEC-2);
– ECIES∗: Certicom Corp., USA and Certicom Corp., Canada
– RSA-OAEP∗: RSA Laboratories Europe, Sweden and RSA Laboratories,
USA.
Digital signature algorithms:
– ECDSA: Certicom Corp., USA and Certicom Corp., Canada;
– ESIGN∗: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp., Japan;
– RSA-PSS: RSA Laboratories Europe, Sweden and RSA Laboratories, USA;
– SFLASH∗: BULL CP8, France;
– QUARTZ∗: BULL CP8, France.
Identification scheme:
– GPS∗: Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, Paris, BULL CP8, France Te´le´com and
La Poste, France.
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Many of the asymmetric algorithms have been updated at the beginning of
phase 2. For the asymmetric encryption schemes, these changes were driven in
part by the recent cryptanalytic developments, which occurred after the NESSIE
submission deadline [10, 16, 28]. A second reason for these changes is the progress
of standardization within ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 [29]. The standards seem to
evolve towards defining a hybrid encryption scheme, consisting of two compo-
nents: a KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism), where the asymmetric encryp-
tion is used to encrypt a symmetric key, and a DEM (Data Encapsulation Mecha-
nism), which protects both secrecy and integrity of the bulk data with symmetric
techniques (a “digital envelope”). This approach is slightly more complicated for
the encryption of a short plaintext, but it offers a more general solution with
clear advantages. Three of the five NESSIE algorithms (ACE Encrypt, ECIES
and PSEC-2) have been modified to take into account this development. At the
same time some other improvements have been introduced; as an example, ACE-
KEM can be based on any abstract group, which was not the case for the original
submission ACE Encrypt. Other submitters decided not to alter their submis-
sions at this stage. For further details, the reader is referred to the extensive
ISO/IEC draft document authored by V. Shoup [29]. The NESSIE project will
closely monitor these developments. Depending on the progress, variants such
as RSA-KEM defined in [29] may be studied by the NESSIE project.
For the digital signature schemes, there seem to be less problems with security-
related issues; nevertheless, three out of five schemes (ESIGN, QUARTZ and
SFLASH) have been altered. In this case, there are particular reasons for each
algorithm (correction for the security proof to apply, improve performance, or
preclude a new attack). The other two have not been modified. It should also be
noted that PSS-R, which offers very small storage overhead for the signature,
has not been submitted to NESSIE. QUARTZ offers very short signatures (16
bytes), but the signing algorithm is very slow and the public key is large.
4.3 Intellectual Property
While it would be ideal for users of the NESSIE results that all algorithms
recommended by NESSIE were in the public domain, it is clear that this is for
the time being not realistic. The users in the NESSIE PIB have clearly stated
that they prefer to see royalty-free algorithms, preferably combined with open
source implementations. However, providers of intellectual property typically
have different views.
One observation is that in the past, there has always been a very large differ-
ence between symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Therefore it
is not so surprising that NIST was able to require that the designers of the block
cipher selected for the AES would give away all their rights, if their algorithm
was selected; it is clear that this is not a realistic expectation for the NESSIE
project.
We will attempt to summarize the intellectual property statements of the
submissions retained for the 2nd phase. Note however that this interpretation
is only indicative; for the final answer the reader is referred to the intellectual
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property statement on the NESSIE web page [19], and to the submitters them-
selves.
Eleven out of 22 algorithms that are still being considered are in the pub-
lic domain, or the submitters indicate that a royalty-free license will be given.
These are the block ciphers Khazad, Misty1, Shacal, Safer++, the stream cipher
BMGL, the MAC algorithms Two-Track-MAC and UMAC, the hash function
Whirlpool, the public-key encryption algorithm RSA-OAEP2, and the digital
signature schemes SFLASH and RSA-PSS.2
Royalty-free licenses will be given under very broad conditions for the block
cipher Camellia, for the public-key encryption algorithms EPOC-2 and PSEC-
KEM, and for the digital signature scheme ESIGN (the main exception occurs
when someone holds IPR on a primitive in the same class and implements the
complete class of recommended algorithms).
The block cipher IDEA is free for non-commercial use only; for commer-
cial applications a license is required. Licenses under fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms will be given for the public-key encryption scheme ACE-
KEM (the detailed license conditions are rather complex) and for the digital
signature scheme QUARTZ.
Additions to the ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ terms are required for
the public-key algorithms ECDSA and ECIES and the identification scheme
GPS; it is required that the license holder reciprocates some of his rights.
Finally, the submitters of RC6 have indicated that for the time being they
do not longer support RC6 for new applications due to IPR problems.
It is clear that intellectual property is always a complex issue, and it will not
be possible to resolve this completely within the framework of NESSIE. However,
IPR issues may play an important role in the final selection process.
5 Conclusions
Open evaluation initiatives such as AES, RIPE, CRYPTREC, and NESSIE can
bring a clear benefit to the cryptographic research community and to the users
and implementors of cryptographic algorithms. By asking cryptographers to de-
sign concrete and fully specified schemes, they are forced to make choices, to
think about performance optimizations, and to consider all the practical im-
plications of their research. While leaving many options and variants in a con-
struction may be very desirable in a research paper, it is often confusing for a
practitioner. Implementors and users can clearly benefit from the availability of
a set of well defined algorithms, that are described in a standardized way.
The developments in the last years have also shown that this approach can
result in a better understanding of the security of cryptographic algorithms. We
have also learned that concrete security proofs are an essential tool to build
confidence, particularly for public key cryptography (where constructions can
be reduced to mathematical problems believed to be hard) and for constructions
2 This statement does not hold for the variants of RSA with more than two primes.
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that reduce the security of a scheme in an efficient way to other cryptographic
algorithms. At the same time, we have learned from the many alterations made
to the asymmetric primitives that this field may not be completely mature and
that it is essential to study proofs for their correctness.
Another conclusion from the NESSIE project is that there is a clear need for
a very fast and highly secure stream cipher (as the submitted candidates do not
seem to satisfy the requirements).
The NESSIE project is inviting the community at large to further analyze
the candidates for the 2nd phase, and to offer comments on their security, per-
formance and intellectual property status. The project is accepting comments
until mid December 2002, and the final selection will probably be announced by
February 2003.
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